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Introduction
Across the European Union, regions are asserting desire to ether secede from the nation states of which they are a part, or making strong calls for more decision making autonomy.
Sometimes, as in the case of Scotland, this is based on a long history as a 'nation' in their own right, before becoming subsumed into the nation state of which they now form a part.
Alternatively as in the case of Sardinia, calls for autonomy are grounded in claims about a shared present. We might characterise this as a movement of what Guibernau (1999) calls 'nations without States'. Leaving Scotland and its independence referendum aside, this includes Catalunya (Miley 2013 ) and the Basque Country (Gomez-Forbes and Cabeza Perez 2013) questioning their relationship with Spain; Brittany with France (Gemie 2005) , and Friesland with Belgium (Boonen and Hooghe 2014) . Within the first few months of 2014, 4000 people demonstrated in Brussels to call for self-determination (European Free Alliance EFA 2014), and only a few days earlier Hungarian political parties in Transylvania drew up proposals for autonomy for Szeklerland . Pro-independence parties in Sardinia doubled their Parliamentary vote share to 18% in elections held in February (Nationalia 2014b) , and in an unofficial referendum in March, 2.1 million residents of Venice, (out of an electorate of 3.7 million) voted to restore an independent Venetian republic (Daily Telegraph 2014) . This raises questions regarding the relationship between European states and their constituent regions, including possible explanations for what appears to be a pan-European national fragmentation.
Whilst scholars have examined individual instances of internal nationalisms and regionalist movements, explored the primacy of a European identity over a national one (Glencross 2011; Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2011) , and considered the hopes that stateless nations have had of EU support (Hepburn and Elias 2011) , the ongoing strength of claims by nations without states is under theorised as a phenomenon in itself. Traditional explanations might draw on Gellner (2006) to claim that that this phenomenon is linked to the inability of the contemporary European state to adequately represent its regions, which lose attachment to State identity, falling back on invented or actual traditions (see Hobsbawm 1992) to reassert a sense of nationhood. This is certainly the kind of framework within which devolution movements within the UK in the late 20 th century were presented, with scholars such as Nairn (1981) , Hobsbawm (1992) and Hechter (1975) claiming that nationalisms in peripheries were forms of emancipatory movements. Hechter even goes as far as to call such nations 'internal colonies', subject to exploitation by the centre. Leaving aside Connor's (1994) point that some such nationalisms (ie, Catalunya) are in regions that are richer than the states within which they are situated, the contemporary European Union context has technically given the regions much greater attention than might have happened previously (Hepburn and Elias 2011) . Indeed, regional governance is embedded within EU structures as a 'Europe of the Regions' to counter what otherwise may be perceived to be distant and centralised European centres of power (Keating 2000) ; providing a more democratised and federal relationship between regions and Brussels (Keating 2008; Tomaney and Pike, 2006) . This may go some way towards mitigating the alienation often characterised as integral to national fragmentation. However, regions and regionalism requires some further definition.
The 'region' is a complex and contested entity, which Jones and Macleod (2004) describe as being derived from both top-down and bottom-up movements. 'Regional Spaces' refers to the top-down forces of regionalism, whereby economic and political governance structures create rationally bounded territorial units. The old Regional tier of governance in the UK is an example of this. 'Spaces of Regionalism' (Jones and Macleod, 2004) refer to popular grassroots regional movements, based around territorial units independent of governance structures. Willett and Giovannini (2014) discuss the difficulties that governance can have in mobilising local inhabitants behind 'regional spaces', as opposed to the popular movements of 'spaces of regionalism'. In practical terms, this means that regions are not neat, objective categories, but are multi-faceted constructions developed from a range of cultural, political, and economic processes. Official or imagined regions might adhere to the borders of national identities (such as Scotland, or Wales), or alternatively as in the case of Cornwall, nations might be subsumed in within a larger regional body (Willett and Giovannini, 2014) .
There are further factors behind the growing strength of calls for independence or greater autonomy, and a link this comes from the connections that Bond, McCrone and Brown (2003) make with regards to the importance of Scottish national identity to economic development. Indeed, John Agnew in his 2001 article Regions in Revolt, asserts the importance of political economy in regional differentiation, arguing that this became overlooked as devolutionist and separatist movements are usually characterised in terms of ethnicity. This is an interesting claim given that more usually it is argued that the contemporary globalised neoliberal economy flattens out the differences within states (and Gellner's work which ties together nation, state, industrialisation and modernity is part of this), and 'homogenises' differences between nations (see also Ariely, 2012) . The globalised consumption of identities means that national differences become fuzzy, rather than sharp.
At the same time, identities become increasingly individuated, detached from territorial affinities, and based around patterns of consumption (Bauman 2011; Giddens 1991) . In
Bauman's concept of liquid modernity, culture no longer satisfies needs, but is charged with the generation of new needs, to seduce the consumer. However the threats to the nation state as a concept seems to be coming not from global capital, as imagined at the turn of the 21 st century (see Stuart 2001) , but from secessionist and devolutionist movements from within the state.
Indeed, one of the complex processes through which regions have come to play a more significant role is within the global marketplace, through the homogenisation/globalisation nexus discussed above. Here, the mobility of goods and capital within neoliberal economies requires the removal of trade barriers held by nation states (Dicken, 2007) . In a challenge to traditional Westphalian models of statehood, this encourages supra-national entities such as the Single Market of the European Union, although it also applies to the global marketplace.
In this context, regions have become increasingly autonomous and powerful as economic units, as national borders have decreased in their importance (Keating, 2008; Keating, 2000) .
This means that there is an interesting double-movement at work. Whilst the contemporary global economy might be decreasing the influence and identity of the nation state, it might also be providing the space for increasing regional individuation.
This brings us back again to Agnew's point regarding political economy, which warrants
further examination regarding what is occurring in Europe. As alluded to by Bond, McCrone and Brown (2003) , regional governance is not just about democratising political engagement, but also plays a role in the governance of economic development. A key site of this is 'competitive regions' (Herrschel 2010) Moreover it raises the possibility of an interplay between the current strength of regionalist movements in Europe, and contemporary regional economic development. In the next part of this paper we explore how regional identity is interwoven into development strategies and theory, before moving to a case study of Cornwall as an empirical example to consider a possible link between regionalism, economic development and growing regional assertiveness.
In a reversal of the standardisation project of the liberal state (see Gellner 2006) , regional identity has widely become seen as a good in and of itself as a functional tool for improving the economy. For example, Pike, Rodriguez-Pose and Tomaney (2006) provide us with seven approaches to regional development, from which identity emerges as a cross-cutting theme. In truth, these approaches blend into and borrow from each other, so it can be tricky to separate the difference between the 'innovative milieux' of innovation, knowledge and learning, from the 'clustering' of extended neo-classical models, or the 'social capital' of institutionalism and social economy from 'quality of life' in sustainable development. For neo-classicists, it provides a marketable asset which can be used to sell regional products, cluster 'knowledge' around traditions of expertise (Hilpert, 2006) , configure regional innovation systems (Asheim 2012) , and attract inward investment for business. This enhances regional competitiveness in the national, supranational, and international economic environments (Kitson et al. 2004; Cooke 2002) .
This raises the question about whether identity is a good in and of itself, or whether it is good for its utility. At the beginning of this debate, identity, culture, and heritage are a good in and of themselves. However, the long term survival of identities, traditions, and cultural practices was under threat because they had become considered as hopelessly old fashioned, over-romanticised with no part in the technological landscape of the 21 st century (Bruckmeier and Tovey 2008) . The solution to this problem was to emphasise the economic utility of cultural distinctiveness which could be preserved through its commodification for a tourist/heritage market, and through the sale of 'regional' goods (Bessiere 1998) . Regional cultural distinctiveness could be sustained through an emphasis on its economic utility.
Consequently, identity in this discourse shifted from being a good in and of itself, to something whose preservation and conservation was contingent on its economic function.
The function of identity to regional economies has become particularly well developed in the literature and policy which derives from Richard Florida's (2002) 'creative industries'.
Florida claimed that dynamic and innovative individuals are attracted to places within which they can exercise their creativity socially and experience a great quality of life. This creates the kind of lifestyle where an individual can maximise their liberal freedoms, and which is later translated into economic creativity and innovation. Florida claimed that this process fostered the conceptual freedom and innovative milieu which allowed Silicon Valley to flourish. In practical regional policy terms, this is interpreted as encouraging creative and cultural industries in order to attract dynamic entrepreneurs who can contribute to local economies (Herslund 2012; Halfacree 2012) . This requires regional brand identities to draw on specific cultural and historic strengths in order to market the area (Giles et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2005) , plugging in to cultural heritage, innovative milieu and clustering (Aula and Haarmakorpi 2008) , and neo-endogenous growth.
So far, identity is imagined as a passive object, created and fostered either for consumption or to initiate a billiard ball type mechanical chain of events. Robert Putnam's (2000) Social Capital changes this, offering a concept through which identity becomes operationalised and active. Strong local identities both foster and draw on well-developed networks of interactions between individuals, businesses and other organisations (Lee et al. 2005) . From a broader economic perspective, the networks developed and interactions that this enables facilitate information sharing and the development of mutually supportive relationships crucial for a well-functioning business environment (Waters and Lawton Smith 2008; Atterton 2007) . This enables the mobilisation of indigenous potential and enhances human capital, allowing individuals to maximise their personal and economic potential (Shortall 2004) . Participation in traditional cultural and historic events are one way of developing social capital (Baker and Brown 2008) , emphasising the economic function and utility of identity, and illustrating Bond, McCrone and Brown's (2003) argument about the importance of Scottish identity to economic development.
Clearly, identity has utility as a social, economic, and even governance tool, encouraging regions to celebrate their identities and the things that make them different and distinctive from other spaces, in order to compete better in the European and global economy (Herrschel, 2010; Keating, 2008; Willett, 2013) . In practice there can be a risk of identikit regional policies, but it offers the space for regions to assert their identities, and technically consider more locally based forms of governance. This calls for a practical examination of the interplay between newly assertive regions and the identity politics of contemporary economic development. For this we turn to the case study of Cornwall to look at some of the potential effects of using identity as a development tool, asking if there may be a link between identitybased regional development and the growth in nationalist movements.
Method
For the case study we wanted to trace the significance of identity in popular discourse over a period of time, and for this we needed a region that was a nationalist latecomer. It would be difficult to separate out the more regular exemplars of Scotland and Cornwall, in the far South West of the UK has been less successful at making its calls for devolution heard beyond its borders, was previously considered too small to be a governance region in its own right (Willett and Giovannini, 2014; Jones and Macleod, 2004) and so has arrived later in the popular imagination. This makes it a clearer case study to explore the changing nature of regionalism.
The primary research on which the following draws comes from a documentary analysis.
The reason for this is that we wanted to understand the development of Cornish identity in popular discourse over a period of time. In this instance, interview data, with its interpretation of the past from the perspective of the present, would make an interesting next step, but its subjectivity is inappropriate here. To explore the changing nature of the role of identity within economic development in Cornwall we begin with a précis of key economic development documents from the 1970's to the present day. However whilst this highlights the growth in rhetoric around Cornish identity, it does not demonstrate the degree to which
Cornish identity has become embedded into popular consciousness. For this, the second part of our empirical analysis turns to the use of identity-based symbolisms within political discourse in recent Cornish history. Again, here we use a combination of publications and policy/campaign reporting in order to understand how discourse was argued, presented and constructed at the time.
Cornish identity, nationalism and regional economic development
This section is made of two parts. Firstly, we consider the treatment of identity with regards to Cornish development over various late 20 th century moments to the present day. The second part grows out of the need to explore Cornish identity within civil society, and for this we look at the influence of Cornish nationalism in local politics.
It is relatively straightforward to map the shift from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist economy (see Rodriguez et al 2006 , Keating, 2008 onto the rhetoric at the heart of Cornish economic development. In the 1960's, 70's and 80's much of the emphasis was on attracting large manufacturing enterprises to counteract unemployment and depopulation caused by declining traditional industries (Spooner 1972; CIDA 1976; CCC 1977) . This was not just about importing jobs to soak up growing unemployment, but was founded on the belief that a critical mass of population is required in order to sustain a functioning economy. Rural
Cornwall with its small towns, sparsely populated hinterlands and numerous small businesses with little value added needed to be shaped to fit prevailing sectoral economic orthodoxy (see also Keating 2000) . Needless to say, identity and cultural issues were far removed from the rational economy, and perhaps could even be considered antithetical to the rational efficiency of market principles (Cooke 2002 ensuring that businesses met economic development targets, but that not enough was given to trying to make businesses internationally competitive, building on sectors where Cornwall already had market strengths. This report is interesting, vocalising a shift from a 'development aid' type of culture, where Cornwall had to grow from the outside in, become more like other urban areas and was reliant on assistance to do so, to one where development is seen as needing to grow from the inside out, much more akin to the social capital type of development, articulated by Lee et al. (2005) . This involved nurturing existing strengths and building local capacity in order to compete internationally as a territorially bounded space (see Herschel 2010; Keating 2008).
Nevertheless, although this is starting to signal something new in regional economic governance, it was not until the end of the decade that this change was really in evidence, following the campaign for EU structural funding. Cornwall does not neatly overlay EU regional governance structures, and is a NUTS 2 region, rather than NUTS 1 area like Scotland or Wales. The 1990's campaign to acquire NUTS2 has already been dealt with elsewhere (Willett 2013 ), but it is useful to consider it here briefly as it is illustrative of the interplay between regional governance, economic development, and identity politics in funding, but it could not make Cornish ethnicity resonate with the broader population, to the extent that its symbolisms are adopted within business and popular culture with the frequency that they are. In other words, regional competitiveness has not made Cornwall assert its national heritage, but it does seem to have contributed to the space within which it has been able to take hold in ways that were not possible in different times. But what this does not yet make clear, is the extent to which an increasingly assertive cultural regional identity, translates into political mobilisations, and for this we turn to an exploration of political nationalism within contemporary Cornwall.
Cornish nationalism, Mebyon Kernow and agenda setting
To follow Smith (1991) , the politicisation of identity is the space where culture becomes mobilised. We might conceptualise this as being a cultural mediation between the present and the past, translated into the future through politics. In Cornwall, political identity is encapsulated in its nationalist party, Mebyon Kernow. However to date, Mebyon Kernow
have not yet secured a deposit in a general election, and whilst they have outpolled Labour in local elections, within Cornwall Council they are currently the 6th largest group with 4 councillors out of 123 (Cornwall Council 2015) . On the face of it, despite the growing importance of regional identity within and outside the UK (Keating, 2008) , party political
Cornish nationalism appears as a persistent minority rather than as a significant force. On initial inspection therefore, it would appear that this contemporary regional identity is all about political economy (see Agnew 2001) in a globalised or supranational environment (Dicken, 2007) , where the region is an increasingly important actor. However we will assert George; indicating that there is more support for MK than analysis election results suggests.
Indeed, Payton (1993) notes a strong anti-metropolitan bias across 20 th Century Cornish politics, combining socio-economic critiques with calls for some form of devolved decision making, to which the London-based parties have responded to some degree. To explore identity in Cornish politics we take a thematic approach identifying three core identity themes.
Boundary politics. Devonwall and keep Cornwall whole
The integrity of the Cornish/Devon border has been a contentious issue for a long time (Payton, 1993) . This incorporates furore from the centralisation of policing services between Devon and Cornwall starting in 1964 and continues across the modernising, centralising and 'rationalising' of many services in what came to be neologised as 'Devonwall' (Deacon et al., 2003) . Accepted as necessary by most political groupings but fiercely resisted by MK and associated identity-based campaigners, resistance to Devonwall is articulated in an MK press release as that "Any erosion of our traditional boarders whether they be along the Tamar in But do actions like these constitute a growing sense and mobilisation of local identity that might be linked to the utility of identity for development and governance purposes (Giles et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2005) ? We claim that traditionally, boundary politics has been an MK preserve that is occasionally utilised by the London-based parties. What is striking about 'Keep Cornwall Whole', was that regardless of how MP's eventually voted, it would have been political suicide not to visibly support the campaign, and it certainly seems to reflect a deepening confidence in a broadly supported sense of Cornish identity. Whilst Cornish
Culture has become embedded into governance and economic development discourses, it has also become legitimised as a part of the political debate.
A Cornish Assembly
Although regional governance is embedded into EU structures (Keating 2008) 
Agenda Setting?
Clearly there is a correlation in Cornwall between a newly confident identity, regional development practices which value the utility of identity, and the willingness of mainstream parties to adopt territory previously considered the preserve of Cornish nationalism. There are two things to draw out of the above analyses to support the claim that support for Cornish identity politics has become widespread and ubiquitous.
Firstly, it is striking that Cornish identity politics is not confined to the nationalist political 
Conclusion
It is impossible to say at this stage that there is a causal relationship between the growth of regionalism, identity politics in contemporary economic development, and the improved agenda setting capacity of Mebyon Kernow in Cornwall. However there does appear to be a strong correlation which warrants further investigation. Far from the globalised neo-liberal economy signalling an end to territorial differentiation (Bauman 2011 ) and the homogenisation of identities in the UK and in Europe (Ariely 2012) , it has provided the spaces and platforms for territorial identities to make a resurgence. The movement which has diminished national trade barriers and encouraged a globalised or supranational economy (Dicken, 2007) , has allowed regions to become increasingly autonomous economic units (Keating, 2008) . Regionalist identity politics is thereby strengthened through a tripartite conceptual system meaning that devolution and separatism runs much deeper than merely a cultural phenomenon -which happens to have brought forth a political movement. Instead it may have become embedded within an economic framework which underpins a popular worldview. What this calls for now, is a comprehensive comparative study between EU regions, economic policy and practice, and autonomist and separatist movements. This also signals the requirement for serious strategic debate across the EU about the relationship between the contemporary economy, nations and regions, autonomy and separatism. It also means that both the academy and policy needs to consider more of the interplay between politics, culture, and economics.
